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LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
I. INTRODUCTION
The so-called Falkland Islands War of April-June 1982 gener-
ated great polemic and debate over military, political, economic
and legal issues.' Even so, scant serious attention has been focused
upon possible geo-strategic implications or likely insinuations aris-
ing from the conflict. This appears to be the case particularly with
the situation in the Antarctic - a region wherein both Great Brit-
ain and Argentina have espoused inherently conflicting territorial
claims of sovereignty and purported administrative jurisdiction.2
Accordingly, several salient questions are begged: given the Falk-
lands military crisis of 1982, what geopolitical ramifications, if any,
should be inferred about ongoing Anglo-Argentinian activities in
and around the Antarctic continent? What justifications under in-
ternational law have been proferred for each state's respective ter-
ritorial claims in the region, and to what extent are their legal posi-
tions incompatible with each other? What genuine merits to legal
title have been accrued to Great Britain and Argentina vis-Ai-vis
their respective claims over portions of Antarctica and select cir-
cumjacent island groups? Is the Antarctic regime currently in place
sufficiently stable to withstand the political challenge of a disrup-
tive outbreak of Anglo-Argentinian rivalry over Antarctica? Fi-
nally, what likelihood exists for such a conflictual eventuality, and
what factors could operate either to precipitate or to deter a possi-
ble military confrontation between the two powers? This article
seeks to address these queries by examining both Argentina's and
Great Britain's historical experiences in the Antarctic region, as-
certaining the nature of their territorial claims there, and assessing
the relative prospects for cooperation or confrontation in the wake
of the 1982 Falkland Islands War. From this analysis, hopefully, a
better understanding can be gleaned about the historical nuances
and legal complexities earmarking Anglo-Argentinian rivalry in the
region - not only for the Falkland Islands situation in particular,
but also for the broader Antarctic context.
1. Franck, Dulce et Decorum Est: The Strategic Role of Legal Principles in the Falk-
lands War, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 109(1983); Hassan, The Sovereignty Dispute Over the Falk-
land Islands, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 53(1982); Moorer & Cottrell, In the Wake of the Falklands
Battle, 10 STRATEGic Ray. 23(1982); and Freedman, The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982,
61 FOREIGN AFF. 196(1982); Calvert, Sovereignty and the Falklands Crisis, 59 INT'L A?. 405
(1983); Dunnett, Self Determination and the Falklands, 59 INT'L AFF. 415 (1983); Reisman,
The Struggle for the Falklands, 93 YALE L.J. 287 (1983).
2. See the discussion at notes 40-85 and 114-152 infra.
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II. ARGENTINA'S ANTARCTICAN EXPERIENCES, 1834-1958
A. Exploration and Development Activities
It is clear that Argentina has historically regarded the
Antarctic region to be strategically significant.3 Serious concern
persists about the ostensible need to protect the Argentinian main-
land's southern flank from attack or possible blockade." Put
tersely, the South Atlantic Ocean in general and the Antarctic con-
tinent in particular are seen not merely as distant, frigid, ice-cov-
ered wastelands; rather, they are perceived as embodying in all too
proximitious springboard from which hostile military activity
someday could be posed to threaten Argentina's national security.5
No doubt, Argentina's security anxieties stem not only from
geographical realities, but also from historical experience in the
area - perhaps most emphatically, the long-standing dispute with
Great Britain over, inter alia, the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands.'
Since British occupation of the Falklands in 1834, the Argentine
Government has neither been willing to recognize legally Great
Britain's presence' nor to accept politically any proclaimed British
administration over territorial claims in the area.8 Indeed, for Ar-
gentina especially, the disputes with Great Britain over the Falk-
land Islands and portions of Antarctica are viewed in effect as one
and the same, a perception quite evident in the Argentine litera-
ture.9 In this connection, it warrants notation that the Islas
3. See, e.g., P. DE MoRSs Rutz, ANTARTIDA ARGENTINA, ISLAS OCEANIcAs, MAR ARGZN-
TINO (1948); Alavraqui, La Ant6rtida, 27 REmsTA GzoGRAFICA AmERICANA 71(1947); R.
MORENO, SOBERANiA ANTARTCA ARGENTINA (1951); Moreno, El Continente Antartico, El
Sector Argentino . .. es el mas importante de la Antdrtida, 29 REVISTA GEOGRA ICA AmEm-
CANA 1(1948); El Porvenir de la Artdrtida, 30 REYiSTA GEOGRAPICA AmERICANA 193(1948).
4. See generally J. PuIG, LA ANTArrWTA ARGENTINA ANTE EL DERCHO (1960); J. FRAGA,
EL MAR Y LA ANTARTIDA EN LA GEOPOLfTICA ARGENTINA 197-220 (1980).
5. But compare Moneta, Antarctica, Latin America, and the International System in
the 1980s: Toward a New Antartic Order?, 23 J. INTKEAM. STUD. & WORLD App. 29(1981).
6. See, e.g., J. GOEEFL, THE STRUGGLE FOR THE FALKLAND ISLANDS: A STUDY IN LEGAL
AND DIPLOMATIC HISTORY (1927); R CmLLL-r-Bois, UNA TRRA ARGENTINA: LAS ISLAS
MALVINAS (1948); C. COSTA, EL PROBLEMA DR LAS ISLAS MALVINAS (1964); E. Frla, LA DIs-
PUTA CON GRAN BRETARA POE LAS ISLAS DEL ATLAN'rco Suu (1968).
7. British occupation of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in 1833-34 was actually a re-
settlement. The United Kingdom had evacuated the islands in 1774.
& For early correspondence between Buenos Aires and Great Britain over claims to the
Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, see 20 BRIT. FOREIGN & ST. PAPERS 346-47 (1832-33), and 22
BRIT. FOREIGN & ST. PAPERS 366-94 (1833-34).
9. See, e.g., ARGENTINA MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, SOBERANIA ARGENTINA EN EL ARCHIPI9-
LAGO DE LAS MALVINAS Y EN LA ANT)LRTIDA (1951); E.D. MOLANO AND E. HOMiEr, TIEREAS
AUSTRALES ARGENTINAS MALVINAS-ANTARTIDA (1948); J. MORENO, NUESTRAs MALVINAS, LA
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Malvinas (and other Antarctic-related claims) have been treated
politically and legally by Argentina as if they were sovereign na-
tional territory.' 0 For example, school children are taught from
early ages that these areas are integral facets of the Argentinian
homeland;" the population of these regions - particularly the
Malvinas (Falklands) - are included in Argentina's national cen-
sus returns;"2 and, island residents visiting Argentina are treated as
Argentine citizens, being liable for call into the military service and
required to carry Argentinian passports.'3
Prior to 1900, Argentina expressed only passing interest in the
Antarctic."' In 1903, however, the Argentinian gunboat Uruguay
successfully completed that state's first voyage through Antarctic
waters, and in the process, rescued the Nordenskjdld expedition
from the Snow Hill Islands." The following year, in February 1904,
at the invitation of the Scottish National Antarctic Expedition, Ar-
gentina assumed official control over the meteorological observa-
tory on Laurie Island in the South Orkneys, and has maintained
its operation continuously since then."
Although Argentine Antarctic activities remained dormant
over the next two decades, 7 in 1927 two events reinvigorated inter-
ANTARTIDA (1948).
10. See M. HIDALGO Niro, LA CUESTION DE LAS MALVINAS (1947); S. COMERC, LA
SOHERANIA ARGENTINA EN EL ANTARTIco (1977); V. LEBEDEN, LA ANTARTIDA (1965).
11. See, e.g., G. ALBORNOZ DE VIDELA, Evita, LIBRO DE LECTURA PARA PRIMER GRADo
INFERIOR 24-25 (1953).
12. E. CHRISTIE, THE ANTARCTIC PROBLEM 265 (1951).
13. Id.
14. Argentina's interest in the Antarctic region was first chronicled in 1890 when it
proposed to Great Britain the possibility of erecting a lighthouse in the South Shetlands.
The proposal, however, was dropped, reportedly because the British "viewed this project
with disfavor." Id.
15. Hanessian, Jr., National Interests in Antarctica, in ANTARCTICA 11 (T. Hatherton
ed. 1965).
16. DECREE No. 3,073 (Authorizing the Argentine Meteorological Office to take over the
Meteorological Station on the South Orkney Islands), in U.S. DEP'T. STATE, HISTORY AND
CURRENT STATUS OF CLAIMS IN ANTARCTICA (OIR Dept. No. 4,296), at 29. See also J.
MONETA, CUATRO Alos EN LAS ORCADAS DEL SUR (1939). Cf. Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty
in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, 25 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 330-32 (1948), and CHISTIE,
supra note 12, at 266.
17. Of note during the interim period, however, was a series of negotiations during
1913-1914, between Argentina and Great Britain aimed at securing a treaty concerning ces-
sion of the South Orkney Islands. See BRrr. FOREIGN Opp., FILE No. Am. GEN./47990/169/
1913 in PUB. REL. OFF., FILE No. F0371/1871 (Argentine Draft of a Convention with the
United Kingdom concerning the cession of the South Orkney Islands), reprinted in 1 ANT-
ARCTICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF INTER-STATE AND NATIONAL DOCUMENTS
575(W. Bush compl. 1982) [hereinafter cited as ANTARCTICA & INT'L L.J.
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est in the region. During that year a radio transmitter was installed
at Laurie Island,15 and coincidentally, Argentina first enunciated
its claims officially in a statement delivered to the Universal Postal
Union:
With reference to your circular letter 2122/53 of March 22nd
last, regarding our request for reports on the territorial jurisdic-
tion of each Administration of the Postal Union, I have the hon-
our to request you to cause the different offices of the said Pos-
tal Union to be informed that Argentine territorial jurisdiction
extends de jure and de facto over the continental surface, terri-
torial sea and islands situated off the maritime coast, to a por-
tion of the Islands of Tierra del Fuego, the Archipelago of
Staten, New Year, South Georgia, South Orkneys and polar ter-
ritory not delimited."
Argentina initiated more extensive Antarctic-related endeav-
ors during the 1940's, beginning with the creation, by government
decree, of a permanent National Commission on the Antarctic
(Comisi6n Nacional del Anttrtico) on April 30, 1940.20 Two years
later, the Argentinian naval transport Primero de Mayo (or 10 de
Mayo) undertook a highly visible Antarctica expedition, visiting
Deception Island, Melchin Island, and Winter Island en route.2 1 Of
greater legal significance, the Primero de Mayo deposited on these
islands bronze tablets bearing inscriptions which proclaimed
Argentinian annexation of all lands lying within the area south of
latitude 600 South and between longitudes 250 West and 680 34'
West.22
The election of Juan Peron in 1946 stabilized Argentina's do-
18. Argentine Note to the United Kingdom affirming Sovereignty over the South Ork-
ney Islands, (Dec. 15, 1927), BRIT. FOREIGN OFF., FILE No. A384/128/2/1928, IN PM. REL.
OrF., FILE No. F0371/12735, at 107-08, reprinted in ANTARCTICA & INT'L L., supra note 17,
at 586-87.
19. Letter to the Director General of the Universal Postal Union (14 Sept. 1927), re-
printed in U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, 46 INT'L L. Docs. 218-19(1948-49).
20. DECREE No. 61,852-M.97 (Establishing the National Antarctic Commission) (April
30, 1940); Argentina, BOLETIN OvICIAL, 8 Nov. 1941, at 2, translated and reprinted in 4
POLAR REC. 414-415(1946) and U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, 46 INT'L L. Docs. 219-20(1948-49).
21. Hayton, The "American" Antarctic, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 583,589(1956); CHRISTIE,
supra note 12, at 268-69.
22. Hayton, supra note 21, at 589. Interestingly enough, the British Ambassador in
Buenos Aires returned one of these bronze plaques to the Government of Argentina on Feb-
ruary 11, 1943, thereby sparking what became a protracted exchange of diplomatic corre-
spondence between the two states. Id. and CHISTIE, supra note 12, at 269. For reprinted
examples of the correspondence, see Id. at 305-16. The Latin American view is supplied in
C. ALZ RRECA, HIsToRIA DE LA ANTRTIDA 213-34, 263-79, 293-305 and 329-56(1949).
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mestic situation and perforce allowed the government an opportu-
nity to elevate Antarctica as a principal focus of Argentina's politi-
cal, military and diplomatic concern.2 That year, a significant
governmental expeditionary program was initiated in Graham's
Land (later Palmer Peninsula), and concurrently, a vigorous pub-
licity campaign was launched domestically to make the Argen-
tinian people more Antarctica-conscious.24 Thus, by November
1946, sufficient cartographical evidence had been accumulated to
suggest that Argentina tacitly had accepted sectorization of its
claim to the Antarctic continent, 5 consisting of a territorial wedge
emanating outward from the South Pole between 250 and 740
West Longitude, bounded to the north by the 600 parallel.2
Argentina's policy posture in negotiating the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty) in 1947 was also
significant.2 7 Perusal of this regional security compact reveals at
least three very interesting pertinent provisions. First, "an armed
attack by any State against an American State [would] be consid-
ered as an attack against all the American States."2 Second, the
area applicable for the Treaty's designated jurisdiction specifically
included the South Pole,2 9 as well as longitudinal boundaries
designed to encompass Argentina's Antarctic claims.30 Third, the
Peron Government appended to the Treaty text a formal reserva-
tion which retained Argentina's national rights over claims in the
Antarctic-circumpolar region."1 As a consequence, the "American
23. See, e.g., DECREE No. 8,944 (Prohibiting the Publication of Maps of the Argentine
Republic which do not Show in their Full Extent the Continental and Insular Area of the
Nation) (Sept. 2, 1946); Argentina, BOLETIN OFCIAL, 19 Nov. 1946, at 2-3, translated in
BRIT. FOREIGN OFF. FILE No. A396/24/2/1938, in PuB. REL. OFF., FILE No. F0371/21408, at
24, reprinted in 1 ANTARCTICA & INT'L L., supra note 17, at 619.
24. Hanessian, supra note 15, at 11.
25. HAYTON, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN ANTARCTICA 7(1959); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra
note 16, at 34.
26. These sector coordinates were depicted on a map published in December, 1946
under authority of Decree No. 8944 by the Instituto Geogrico Militar. For discussion, see 1
ANTARCTICA & INT'L L., supra note 17, at 627-31.
27. Done at Rio de Janeiro, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 STAT. 1681 T.I.A.S.No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S.
77 [hereinafter cited as Rio Treaty].
28. Id. art 3(1).
29. Id. art 4.
30. Id.
31. The Argentine statement read as follows:
The Argentine Delegation declares that within the waters adjacent to the South
American Continent, along the coasts belonging to the Argentine Republic in the
Security Zone, it does not recognize the existence of colonies or possessions of
European countries and it adds that it especially reserves and maintains intact
[Vol. 15:3
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Antarctic" effectively became subsumed under the Rio Treaty's se-
curity perview.8' Moreover, a commitment was agreed to by the
parties, including the United States, to resist "aggression" against
Argentina by any "extracontinental Power," (ostensibly read by
the Argentinian Government to mean "Great Britain").33
Antedating inception of the current Antarctic Treaty Regime
in 1961, Argentina's activities involving the circumpolar region
during the 1950's assumed an increasingly nationalistic hue. In
1951, the Antarctic Institute (Instituto Antdrctico Argentina) was
created and placed under the policy aegis of the Ministry of the
Army.34 Four years later, on June 28, 1955, new national legisla-
tion, the "Provincialization of the National Territories," was
promulgated. 0 As avowed, this new law formally incorporated Ar-
gentina's South Atlantic territories into provinces of the national
federal domain. 3 Relatedly, on February 28, 1957, the Argentinian
Government officially proclaimed establishment of "The National
Territory of Tierra del Fuego, the Antarctic and the Islands of the
South Atlantic. '37 Including the Islas Malvinas, this new national
territory was reaffirmed as an integral part of the Argentinian
the legitimate titles and rights of the Argentine Republic to the Falkland
(Malvinas) Islands, the South Georgian Islands, the South Sandwich Islands,
and the lands included in the Argentine Antarctic sector, over which the Repub-
lic exercises the corresponding sovereignty.
21 U.N.T.S. 1173; 17 DEP'T ST. BULL. 21,572 (1947). In a similar statement, Chile declared
its non-recognition of European possessions in the Security Zone. See 21 U.N.T.S. 175, 17
DEP'T ST. BULL. 21,572 (1947).
32. Argentina later declared the Antarctic to be officially within its national security
zones. See DECREE No. 31,813 (Extending Security Zones to the Antarctic Region) (Oct. 13,
1948), reprinted in 5 POLAR REC. 480-81(1950). Chile has also indicated that an "American
Antarctic" exists and that it is considered an integral part of the Western Hemisphere. See
El Mercurio (Santiago), Feb. 19, 1958; La Naci6n (Santiago), Feb. 19, 1958.
33. Rio Treaty, supra note 27, at art. 6; Hayton, supra note 21, at 593.
34. DECREE No. 7,338 (April 17, 1951); Argentina, BOLL-rN OjiciAL, Apr. 23, 1951,
translated in 7 POLAR REc. 80-81(1954); Hanessian, supra note 15, at 11. The Argentine
Antarctic Institute was elevated in status by DEcRE-LAw No. 1,311 (Jan. 26, 1956); Argen-
tina, BOLETIN OFIcIAL, Feb. 2, 1956, at 1.
35. LAw No. 14,408; Argentina, BOLErIN OucxiAL, June 30, 1955; Hayton, supra note 21,
at 590.
36. The southern-most province created was described as:
bounded on the north by the parallel 460; on the east by the Atlantic Ocean; on
the west by the line of delimitation with the Republic of Chile, and to the south,
with the Pole, including Tierra del Fuego, the islands of the South Atlantic and
the Argentine Antarctic Sector.
LAW No. 14, 408, supra note 35, at art. 1(c).
37. DE CR-LAw No. 2,191(Feb. 28, 1959); Argentina, BOLErIN OFiCIL, Mar. 19, 1957,
translated in 9 POLAR REc. 52-53(1958).
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homeland,3 8 and, supposedly, would be administered from its pro-
vincial capital of Ushuaia in Tierra del Fuego.3 9
B. Argentina's Claims to Legal Title
In light of the above observations, Argentina's assertions to le-
gal title over territories in the South Atlantic-Antarctic are predi-
cated upon certain historical, geographical and geological consider-
ations peculiar to the area.
Respecting history, often cited by Argentina to substantiate its
claims to selected lands in the Antarctic, is the Laurie Island facil-
ity in the South Orkneys. In the Argentinian view, then, uninter-
rupted maintenance since February 22, 1904, of this weather sta-
tion constitutes sufficient effective occupation under international
law to advance a bona fide claim meriting territorial sovereignty in
the region.40 Reinforcing this claim is the allegation that certain
symbolic acts were performed during the course of Argentina's re-
ceiving the Laurie Island outpost from Scottish jurisdiction in
1904. Namely, after completing formal transfer, the Argentinian
flag was raised over the station as a gesture of national owner-
ship.' In addition, an Argentinian citizen present at the occasion
performed a stamp cancellation ceremony, purportedly to demon-
strate establishment there of a post office," a factor which under
international law generally is considered to indicate administrative
jurisdiction and sovereign control over a territory."8
Argentina's longevous and consistent operation of the Laurie
Island facility are not at issue. However, serious questions do arise
as to whether such continuous presence on a single relatively insig-
nificant islet can constitute such a degree of effective occupation
that it serves to legitimate Argentina's concomitant claims to the
Malvinas/Falklands, South Georgia, the South Shetlands, and the
38. Id. art 2.
39. Id. art 4.
40. DE MONES Ruiz, supra note 3, at 44. In addition, February 22 is a national Argen-
tine holiday. See note 50 infra.
41. Dispatch from G. Grahame, British Minister in Buenos Aires to Marquess of Lans-
downe (July 7, 1904), BRIT. Pum. REL. OFF., File No. F083/1976, at 254, reprinted in 1 ANT-
ARCTICA & INT'L L., supra note 17, at 558.
42. CHRISTIE, supra note 12, at 266. See also 1 ANTARCTICA & INT'L L. supra note 17, at
555-56.
43. See Taubenfeld, A Treaty for Antarctica, 531 Irr'L CONCILIATION 245,252 (1961)
and Bagshewe & Goldup, The Postal History of the Antarctic 1904-1949, 6 POLAR REC.
45(1951).
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South Sandwich group, as well as some 400,000 square miles of
land space on the Antarctic mainland." Logically, logistically, and
legally, one can not but harbor grave doubts about such an
assertion.
Absent actual prolonged settlement, no legal credibility is at-
tached to symbolic acts." Argentina has gone to considerable
lengths to highlight its claims in the circumpolar area by perform-
ing several intermittent ceremonial acts implying administration,
including dispositing property plaques,"6 designating postmasters,'
coroners and local magistrates,' issuing postage stamps commemo-
rating the claimed territories,4" birthing children there,50 and de-
claring a national "Antarctic" holiday.1 International law, never-
theless, regards such activities as mere forms of "fictitious
occupation," without any real legal foundation.2 Consequently,
Argentina's symbolic acts of sovereignty in the region are regarded
by most legal commentators as just that: symbolic acts, not actual
facts.
Perhaps more interesting, from the legal historian's vantage
point, is Argentina's espoused reliance upon the Latin American
doctrine of uti possidetis juris 5 to bolster its Antarctic-related
claims. This notion asserts that legal title to possessions in the
44. For "firm land" claimed in Argentina sector, the areal figure of 1,000,000 square
kilometers has been posited. FRAGA, supra note 4, at 215 and 216 (Map: Figure 25). On the
validity of Argentina's sector claims, see also A. QuARANTr, EL SEXTO coNTIENTE: APUNTES
PARA EL ESTUDIO DE LA AITARTIDA ARGENTINA 129-32, 181-203(1950) and L. CANElA, His-
TORIA ANTARTICA ARGENTINA, NuESTROs DERECHOS 5-8(1948).
45. Van der Heydte, Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in In-
ternational Law, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 461(1935).
46. See the discussion at note 22 supra.
47, See Argentina, National Commission on the Antarctic, Acts of Argentine Civil Ad-
ministration in the Antarctic 360-61 (1964).
48. Note, Thaw in International Law? Rights in Antarctica under the Law of Common
Spaces, 87 YALE L.J. 819(1978).
49. See II M. WsrrE&.N, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 1258-59(1963); Wilson, Na-
tional Interests and Claims in the Antarctic, 17 ARCTIC 15,23(1964); Bagshewe & Goldup,
supra note 43, at 45.
50. Antarctica's first baby warmly welcomed, 8 ArricTIC 169-70(1978).
51. In 1964, Argentina declared February 22 to be "Argentine Antarctic Day." DEcREE
No. 1,032 (Feb. 18, 1965), Argentina, BoLrlfN OnciAL, 21 Feb. 1964.
52. See A. KELaE, 0. Lissrrz'sN, & F. MANN, CREATION OP RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY
THROUGH SYMOLIC ACTS 1400-1800 (1938) and J. KISH, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SPACES
52(1973).
53. J. Daniel, Conflict of Sovereignty in the Antarctic, 3 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 262-
66(1949). See also Y. BLUM, HISTORIC TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 341-42(1965); 0. Pi-
NOCHET, CHILEAN SOVEREIGNTY IN ANT r ircA(1955), "The 'Uti Possidetis' of 1810 and the
Antarctic Rights of the Republic," at 63-67.
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Western Hemisphere does not spring from occupation and settle-
ment of res nullius lands in the New World, simply because appro-
priate legal title already had been allocated by the Pope to the
Spanish throne in the fifteenth century. 4 In 1493, Pope Alexander
VI issued his famous Bull Inter Caetera, wherein a line was drawn
from Pole to Pole, extending 370 leagues from the Cape Verde Is-
lands.5 5 Concurrently, the Pope declared that all lands lying west
of 460 Longitude belonged to Spain, and those situated east of the
demarcation belonged to Portugal. 6 Not unimportant, too, was
that this papal division of the New World was formally agreed to
by Spain and Portugal in 1494 in the Treaty of TordesillasY In
effect, then, modern legal titles over territories in Latin America
are deemed to have been transferred from the Spanish and Portu-
guese Empires to their legitimate heirs, who were created through
attaining national independence." In sum, the historical essence of
uti possidetis juris has been aptly described as follows:
When the Spanish colonies of Central and South America pro-
claimed their independence in the second decade of the Nine-
teenth Century, they adopted a principle of Constitutional and
International Law to which they gave the name of uti possidetis
juris of 1810. The principle laid down the rule that the bounda-
ries of the newly established republics would be the frontiers of
the Spanish provinces which they were succeeding. This general
principle offered the advantage of establishing the absolute rule
that in law no territory of old Spanish America was without an
owner. To be sure, there were many regions that had not been
54. As C.H.M. Waldock has observed,
The Papal Bull, Inter Caetera, in 1493 and the Spanish-Portuguese Treaty of
Tordesillas in 1494 purported to give all lands discovered or to be discovered
west of a line 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands to Spain and all lands
to the east of that line to Portugal. The precise longitude of the dividing-line is
disputed but even the longitude most favourable to Spain would place South
Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands outside the Spanish sphere of interest,
though it might be said to include the South Orkneys and Antarctic territory to
the west of these islands. The relevance of the Bull Inter Caetera, and of any
discoveries made under it, lies in Argentina's pretension to succeed to Spain's
rights in the area by 'inheritance.'
Waldock, supra note 16, at 319.
55. This Bull and others contemporary to that period are reproduced in 1 EUROPEAN
TREATIES BEARING ON THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES 72-88 (F.
Davenport ed. 1917).
56. The original line in 1493 was 100 leagues from the Cape Verde Islands, but it was
revised in 1496. Daniel, supra note 53, at 249, n. 37. See also GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 49.
57. C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 165(1922).
58. PINOCHET, supra note 53, at 40-43; Beagle Channel Arbitration, 17 I.L.M.
632,642(1978).
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occupied by the Spaniards and many regions that were unex-
plored or inhabited by uncivilised natives, but these sections
were regarded as belonging in law to the respective republics
that had succeeded the Spanish provinces to which these lands
were connected by virtue of old Royal decrees of the Spanish
mother country. These territories, although not occupied in fact,
were by common agreement considered as being occupied in law
by the new republics from the very beginning. Encroachments
and ill-timed efforts at colonisation beyond the frontiers, as well
as occupations in fact, became invalid and ineffective in law.
The principle also had the advantage, it was hoped, of doing
away with boundary disputes between the new States. Finally it
put an end to the designs of the colonising States of Europe
against lands which otherwise they could have sought to pro-
claim as res nullius.
5
9
Thus, Argentina avers that its title to territories claimed in the
South Atlantic and Antarctica flows directly and irrefutably from
the uncontested Spanish title, recognized and sanctioned by Pope
Alexander VI in 1493-1494.
The doctrine of uti possidetis juris is of questionable applica-
bility as a tenet of contemporary international law. As one study
curtly put it, "[Blecause modern international law does not recog-
nize the authority of fifteenth-century pontiffs to bind nations five
centuries later, this theory carries little weight today."6
Nevermind that the Papal Bull of 1493 long antedated creation of
the sovereign nation-state system and the Eurocentric corpus of
international law. The fact remains that uti possidetis juris fails to
square properly with the legal establishment of non-Hispanic
states in the New World, as well as the more recently evolved prin-
ciples of decolonization" and self-determination. 2 Further, save
for Latin American states, succession from original Spanish rights
has neither commanded widespread respect nor attracted interna-
tional acceptance, either in practice or in principle. Hence, this ap-
59. This quotation is from the dictum of the Federal Council of Switzerland which
served as arbiter in the Colombia-Venezuela boundary dispute, as quoted in Scott, The
Swiss Decision in the Boundary Dispute between Colombia and Venezuela, 16 Am. J. INT'L
L. 428(1922).
60. Note, supra note 48, at 814, n. 43. Also see Hayton, supra note 21, at 603.
61. See generally, Y. EL-AYoUTY, THE UNTED NATIONS AND RECOLONIZATION: THE ROLE
OF AFRO-AsIA (1971); L. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGIIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION
(1978).
62. Y. ALEXANDER & R. FRIEDLANDER, SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND
GLOBAL DIMENSIONS(1980); W. OFUATEY-KODJE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1977); and Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 Am. J. INT'L L. 459(1971).
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parent dearth of contemporary legal appreciation strongly inti-
mates that uti possidetis juris contributes but a modicum, if
indeed any, legal support to Argentina's position of valid title over
either its South Atlantic or Antarctic claims."
Turning to factors of geography, Argentina (as well as Chile)"
has advanced the contention that a state's propinquity (i.e., prox-
imity or contiguity) may enhance its claims to legal title else-
where.8' Since Argentina is the closest state to various South At-
lantic islands and Antarctic lands, Argentina argues, that it has a
special right vis-a-vis legal possession - particularly when the no-
tion of sectorization is applied to national claims on the conti-
nent." The sector theory - adapted from the Arctic experience6 7
- defines claimants' territorial boundaries according to longitudi-
nal lines that converge on the South Pole from baselines originat-
ing from two sources: either from mainland perimeters of the
claimant state (e.g., Argentina) or from a section of the Antarctic
coast "discovered" or "occupied" by a claimant state (e.g., Great
Britain).6 8 Though not recognized internationally, sectorization ac-
cordingly has been adopted and implemented by claimants to Ant-
arctica as a means of neatly dividing up the continent.6 9
Nevertheless, while Argentina's proximity to the Antarctic is
geographically evident, employing that rationale for justifying any
resultant legal title fails to measure up. Mere propinquity is not,
nor is it likely to be, respectfully regarded in international law as a
63. L. BLOOMFIELD, THE BRITISH HONDURAS-GUATEMALA DIsPrUrE 94(1953). As F. M. Au-
burn put it,
Uti possidetis can only apply to territory over which Spain had title in 1810, and
there is little evidence of a Spanish claim to any part of Antarctica. It may be
concluded that uti possidetis is a valid rule of intra-American customary inter-
national law, although its extension to the Antarctic is objectively dubious -
but no more questionable, it might be argued, than the sector principle which it
resembles in a number of ways.
F. AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW & POLITICS 50(1982)(footnote omitted).
64. U.S. DEP'T ST., Conference on Antarctica 17 (Pub. No. 7060, 1959). For comprehen-
sive treatments of Chile's view, see PINOCHET, supra note 53; E. VICUf4A, TERRA AusTRAnis
(1948); and, Chile, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Derechos Indiscutibles de Chile Sobre la
Antdrtica Chilena, 1 REviSTA GEOGRAFICA DE CHILE 155(1948).
65. Bernhardt, Sovereignty in Antarctica, 5 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 297,331(1975).
66. Id. at 331-38.
67. See Lakhtine, Rights Over the Arctic, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 703(1930) and G. SManAL,
ACQUISITION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER POLAR REGIONS 58-80(1931).
68. Note, supra note 48, at 822-23. See also Svarlien, The Sector Principle in Law and
Practice, 10 POLAR REC. 248(1960-61).
69. Hayton, supra note 21, at 603-607.
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definitive criterion for asserting legal title to sovereignty."' More-
over, while resort to the sector theory to demarcate claims in Ant-
arctica (and the Arctic as well) admittedly has been utilized by
claimant states as a convenient apportionment device, it has not
been accepted as a universal principle or even a rule of law.2 ' Ex-
pressed another way, legal opinion overwhelmingly concurs that
polar sectorization through propinquity serves primarily as a polit-
ical convenience for the involved parties;" as a steadfast, acknowl-
edged norm of international law, sectorization and its basis for title
has been, in substantial measure, repudiated23
A third aspect of Argentina's legal argument aims at justifying
claims to portions of the circumpolar region upon geological and
geomorphological grounds. Put simply, scientific scrutiny has
prompted geologists to conclude that "the highlands of Antarctica
must be regarded as a continuation of the Andes."'7' Geomorpho-
logical evidence actually has revealed that a regionally submerged
mountain chain does exist, of which the Falkland Islands, Shag
Rocks, South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands, and Graham
Land are parts protruding above water.75 This so-called "Antillan
Loop" is thus believed to be an integral segment of the Andean
70. Note, supra note 48, at 815-16; Bernhardt, supra note 65, at 332. Robert Hayton
expressed the situation aptly when he observed:
It cannot be presumed that the rest of the international community has
given up to states which are accidentally the closest all rights to unoccupied
lands of possible strategic importance, whether or not currently susceptible of
settlement or exploitation. Therefore severe limitations must be placed on the
use in international law of any concept involving 'region of attraction,' propin-
quity or contiguity. As an obvious consequence of the decentralized, semi-anar-
chical conditions of nation-state life, every state is concerned defensively, eco-
nomically and otherwise with the area (land or sea) adjacent to its present
territory. But if applied generally, the absurdity, even the impossibility of such a
principle in law, seems clear. Argentina or Chile cannot claim Antarctic territo-
ries merely for reasons of 'attraction.' If the territory in question is terra nullius,
then the ordinary mode of acquisition must be employed, though the motivation
for presenting such acquisition may well reflect strategic considerations. If it is
not terra nullius, the sovereign is not displaced because of another's contiguity.
'Attraction' of itself yields no title in the Antarctic or elsewhere.
Hayton, supra note 21, at 604 (footnote omitted, italics in original).
71. See AusuRN, supra note 63, at 23-31; Bernhardt, supra note 65, at 338; Hayton,
supra note 21, at 605-06.
72. Note, supra note 48, at 823; AUBURN, supra note 63, at 27-31.
73. Jain, Antarctica: Geopolitics and International Law, 17 INDIAN Y.B. OF WORLD
AFF. 249,266(1974). As Professor Auburn tersely asserted, "A sector is itself an admission of
the failure to comply with the general standards of the law of nations." AUBURN, supra note
63, at 31.
74. Ellsworth, My Flight Across Antarctica, 70 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC MAG. 35(1936).
75. F. MILIA, LA ATLANTkRTIDA 248(1978).
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chain, linking together Tierra del Fuego with the mountains in
Graham Land.7 Perhaps not surprisingly, the Argentinian legal
view holds that Graham Land geologically is an intimate extension
of the Andes system, and, moreover, that the various island groups
associated with it are joined to South America by a prolonged con-
tinental shelf area.77 Consequently, Argentina believes that natu-
rally it should accrue prior claims of sovereignty over these juxta-
posed territories. 78
While Argentina's geomorphological reasoning may be appeal-
ing, its legal deduction proves fallacious - at least by the interna-
tional community's espoused standards. While not discounting the-
oretical contingencies, practice in international law has mandated
that efficacy - rather than purported geological contiguity -
should be the overriding determinant of legal title. As affirmed by
Professor Van der Heydte:
The natural boundary lines of any application of the rule of con-
tiguity are drawn, precisely, by its very origin from the general
principle of effectiveness. Admitting the existence of such a rule,
we only assert the existence of an individual case of applying the
principle of virtual effectiveness as defined above. It is proper,
therefore, to speak of contiguity only as far as one can speak
also off virtual effectiveness.
79
Thus, to accept the notion that Argentina's continental shelf pro-
longation legally constitutes appropriate contiguity vis-&-vis cir-
cumpolar territories not only undercuts the traditional interna-
tional legal framework affecting territorial sovereignty over land;80
it also displaces relevant considerations in the law of the sea, par-
ticularly those principles concerning territorial delimitation of
coastal states,8' the exclusive economic zone,82 the legal status of
76. J. FRAGA, INTRODUCCI6N A LA GEoPOLITICA ANTIARTiCA 25(1978); CHRISTIE, supra note
12, at 263.
77. MILIA, supra note 75, at 248.
78. Id.
79. Van der Heydte, supra note 45, at 470.
80. See generally N. HILL, CLAIMS TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS
(1945); R. JENNINGs, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1963).
81. This conflictual situation becomes even more readily apparent upon scrutiny of the
recently concluded Convention by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, done at Montego Bay, Dec. 10,
1982. U.N. Doe. A/CONF. 62/122(Oct. 7, 1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261-1354(1982).
[Hereinafter cited as UNCLOS III Convention]. See Id. at arts. 2-33 and 76-85.
82. Id. arts 55-75. For commentary, see Joyner, The Exclusive Economic Zone and
Antarctica, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 691(1981).
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islands, 3 and also variant high seas freedoms.8 4 Additionally, ap-
plication of Argentina's geological contiguity position tends to dis-
regard an obvious fact of geography: viz., the lack of sufficient ad-
jacency implicitedly required to legally exercise a claim of
contiguity. It is at best difficult to accept that Argentina can really
qualify as a state "adjacent" to Antarctica, unless some four hun-
dred and fifty miles of ocean space and pack ice are construed to
be a transcontinental bridge."' In short, J. Peter Berngardt put it
well when he concluded, "Applying the contiguity principle to the
Antarctic would be an unwarranted extension of an already over-
stretched idea."' 6
C. Concluding Observations
Argentina historically has manifested considerable national in-
terest in the Antarctic, and since the early 1900's, the Government
has often attempted to demonstrate legitimacy of its claims
through manifold symbolic displays of sovereignty. Further, begin-
ning in the 1940's, the Antarctica-Falklands issue has assumed
high saliency in Argentine domestic politics; coincidentally in the
process it has engendered at times an ultranationalist attitude. Not
expectantly, especially sensitive and acute for Argentinians is the
issue of foreign colonialist domination, which persistantly has been
personified in the perceived intervention by European powers (i.e.,
Great Britain) into Western Hemispheric affairs (i.e., Argentina's
territorial claims in the region). As a diplomatic counterpoise to
the British presence in the South Atlantic-Antarctic, Argentina
contends that its valid legal claims to title have been acquired re-
gionally through succession from the fifteenth century Spanish
Empire, relative proximity to the area, and geomorphological con-
tiguity of the Andes chain transoceanically with the Antarctic
Mountains. Nonetheless, when viewed within the context of con-
temporary international law, Argentina's claims to sovereignty at
best appear to be tenuous, anarchoristic and polemical; at worst,
they may be challenged on grounds of being perfunctory, conten-
tious, and perhaps, even nugatory.
83. UNCLOS III Convention, supra note 81, art. 5 at 121. See generally, D. BOwETT,
THE LEGAL REGIME OF ISLANDS (1979).
84. UNCLOS III Convention, supra note 81, at arts. 86-119.
85. See Major Air and Land Routes, 1976/77 (Map), in CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
POLAR REGIONS ATLAS 49(1978) [hereinafter cited as CIA POLAR ATLAS].
86. Bernhardt, supra note 65, at 342.
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III. GREAT BRITAIN'S ANTARCTICAN EXPERIENCES, 1675-1962
A. Exploration and Development Activities
There is no doubt that Great Britain's presence in the
Antarctic has been evident for more than two centuries.87 The ear-
liest discovery of land in the area is believed to have been South
Georgia in 1675 by the British merchant, Anthony de la Roche." A
century later, the island was "rediscovered" by the English Cap-
tain James Cook, who on January 17, 1775, claimed its possession
for King George III and named it South Georgia in the King's
honor.8 9 In that same month Captain Cook also reportedly discov-
ered and claimed the South Sandwich Island group for Great
Britain.90
The early nineteenth century witnessed numerous exploration
forays into the Antarctic by British expeditions. In February 1819,
William Smith discovered the South Shetlands and claimed them
for the British Crown.9 The first sighting of the Antarctic coast -
probably along the northern extremity known as Trinity Peninsula
on Graham Land - is credited to Edward Bransfield, a Royal
Navy officer, in 1820.92 The South Orkney Islands were discovered
and claimed for Great Britain by George Powell in December
1821." Captain Henry Foster of the Royal Navy explored and
claimed parts of the Antarctic mainland in 1828-1829, and depos-
ited a copper cylinder on Hoseason Island, and declared its posses-
sion in the name of King George IV." Three years thereafter, on
February 21, 1832, Captain John Biscoe circumnavigated the conti-
nent and visited part of the Palmer archipelago.05 Claiming the
area in the name of King William IV, Captain Biscoe mistakenly
called it Graham Land, apparently convinced that he had actually
discovered portions of the mainland.' Between 1841 and 1843, Sir
87. See generally, Antarctica Cases (U.K. v. Argen.)(U.K. v. Chile) 1956 I.C.J. Plead-
ings 11, ff.; Brown, Political Claims in the Antarctic, 1 WORLD AFprs. 393(1947); Daniel,
supra note 53; Waldock, supra note 16; and CHRISTIE, supra note 12.
88. Antarctica Cases, supra note 87, at 11.
89. Id.
90. Id. See generally J. COOK, A VOYAGE TOWARDS THE SOUTH POLE AND ROUND THE
WORLD (3rd ed. 1779).
91. Antarctica Cases, supra note 87, at 11.
92. Id. at 12.
93. Id. at 11.
94. Id. at 12.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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James Clark Ross circumnavigated the continent, charted some
500 miles of coastline in Victoria Land, and discovered Ross Island
and the Northern edge of the Ross Ice Shelf." On January 6, 1843,
Sir Ross landed on the eastern shore of Palmer peninsula, and
claimed Ross Island and all "contiguous lands" for the British
crown.
9 8
Save for whalers, scant British interest was shown in Antarc-
tica over the next fifty years. Between 1895 and 1905, however,
seven major national expeditions set out for Antarctica," of which
two were British-sponsored: the British Antarctic Expedition of
1898-1900 under C.E. Borchgrevink' 00 and the larger British Na-
tional Antarctic Expedition of 1901-04, led by Captain R.F.
Scott.'0 In the following years, private expeditions by British sub-
jects contributed much in the way of scientific discovery and
Antarctic cartography. Foremost among these were Captain Scott's
second expedition (1910-13) in the Ross Dependency102 and the ex-
ploits of Sir Ernest Shackleton (1907-09, 1914-17 and 1921-22) who
claimed possession of the Ross Dependency for Great Britain. 08
Relatedly important to note is that during this "Heroic Age of
Antarctic Exploration," Great Britain formally announced its
claims to portions of the Antarctic: In 1908 '04 and 1917,'05 Letters
Patent were promulgated by the British government, setting out
boundary delimitations for British claim assertions, subsequently
known as the Falkland Islands Dependencies.!0 8
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. For detailed enumeration of Antarctic expeditions, see Roberts, Chronological List
of Antarctic Expeditions, 9 PoLAR REC. 97-134, 199-239(1958).
100. Bogen, Main Events in the History of Antarctic Exploration, NORSK HVALFANGST
TIDENDE 218(1957).
101. See R. SCOTT, THE VOYAGE OF THE 'DiscovmRv' (1905).
102. F. AUBURN, THE Ross DEPENDENCY (1972).
103. BRITISH INFORMATION SERVICE, THE ANTARCTIC 4(1966). See E. SHACKLETON,
SOUTH: THE STORY OF SHACKLETON'S LAST EXPEDITION, 1914-1917 (1920).
104. British letters patent appointing the Governor of the Colony of the Falkland Is-
lands to be Governor of South Georgia, the South Orkneys, the South Shetlands, the Sand-
wich Islands, and Graham's Land, and providing for the Government thereof as Dependen-
cies of the Colony - Westminster, July 21, 1908, reprinted in 101 BRIT. FOREIGN & ST.
PAPERS 76(1909) [hereinafter cited as Letters Patent of July 21, 19081.
105. British letters patent, passed under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom, provid-
ing for the further Definition and Administration of certain Islands and Territories as De-
pendencies of the Colony of the Falkland Islands - Westminster, March 28, 1917, re-
printed in 111 BRIT. FOREIGN & ST. PAPERS 16(1919) [hereinafter cited as Letters Patent of
Mar. 28, 1917].
106. For appropriate commentary, see Waldock, supra note 16.
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From 1923-1939, the Discovery Committee - a British-based
organization - operated to produce more accurate maps of the
Dependencies and to gather information useful to Great Britain's
whaling industry.107 Significantly, a series of survey voyages also
were sponsored under the committee's direction, leading to en-
hanced oceanographical studies of the Southern Ocean, two cir-
cumnavigations of the Antarctic continent, and re-charting the
coasts of South Georgia, the South Orkneys, the South Sheltands
and the South Sandwich Islands.105
British appreciation of the Antarctic's strategic importance
was accentuated by World War II. Accordingly, during 1943-45,
"Operation Tabarin" was undertaken to secure military bases at
Deception Island and Graham Land, ostensibly to preclude an
"Antarctic coup" by either Argentine or German forces.109 In 1945,
these stations were transformed jurisdictionally into the Falkland
Islands Dependencies Survey 1 - renamed the British Antarctic
Survey in 1967111 - under whose aegis British exploration and sci-
entific activities in the region has since been conducted.11
Finally, in terms of regional experience historically, in 1962,
Britain established, through an Order-in-Council, the British
Antarctic Territory. 113 Effective since March 3, 1962, the territory
as designated would comprise all lands and islands lying south of
60'S latitude and between 200 and 80OW longitudes (i.e., encom-
passing all British-claimed territories within the area set out in the
Antarctic Treaty of 1959)."" The "Falkland Islands Dependencies"
therefore were reduced in size to only South Georgia, the South
Sandwich group, and various oceanic rock formations - all located
north of the Antarctic Treaty perimeter.
107. CHRISTIE, supra note 12, at 212-219.
108. See The Discovery Committee, THE DIsCOvERY REPORTS (24 vols. 1929-47).
109. CHRISTIE, supra note 12, at 247-51.
110. Id. at 251-62.
111. British Antarctic Territory, in A YEAR1OOK OF THE COMMONWEALTH 1982,
429(1982).
112. Id. at 429-30.
113. British Antarctic Territory Order in Council, 1962, Statutory Instrument, 1962,
No. 400,71 Falkland Islands Gazette, Mar. 2, 1962, at 50-53, reprinted in 11 POLAR REc.
306-11(1962-63).
114. British Antarctic Treaty Order in Council, 1962, Statutory Instrument, 1962, No.
401,71 Falkland Islands Gazette, Mar. 2, 1962, at 54-59, reprinted in 11 POLAR REC. 310-
13(1962-63).
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B. Great Britain's Claims to Legal Title
Of all states indicating serious interest in the South Atlantic-
Antarctic area prior to 1900, none was more active than Great
Britain. To be sure, the historical record speaks for itself, particu-
larly in terms of British discovery and exploration efforts. Cer-
tainly, also important is the fact that those explorers who had laid
claim to various territories in the South Atlantic and Antarctic for
Great Britain were officers in the Royal Navy, duly commissioned
and officially assigned to make these voyages in the name of the
King. This realization undeniably imparts some measure of gov-
ernmental legitimacy to British claims made in the region. Even
so, the issue to be addressed here is the extent to which British
allegations of sovereign control over Antarctic territories merit
valid title under international law.
Generally speaking, under contemporary international law, six
methods of acquiring title to territory are recognized by states: oc-
cupation, accretion, prescription, voluntary cession, conquest, and
treaties of peace.115 Historically, discovery represented the para-
mount means of securing title to vacant lands (i.e., terre nul-
lius).16 Since the eighteenth century, however, discovery alone has
been deemed insufficient to effect a claim of valid legal title; it
must be followed by "effective" occupation (occupatio),", ostensi-
bly demonstrated through permanent settlement and responsible
administrative jurisdiction.118 It is largely on the grounds of discov-
ery and consequent effective occupation that Great Britain's claims
to Antarctic territories are predicated.11 9
As formally posited, Great Britain's claim has been summarily
stated as follows:
... that by reason of historic British discoveries of certain terri-
tories in the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic; by reason of the long-
continued and peaceful display of British sovereignty from the
date of those discoveries onwards in, and in regard to, the terri-
tories concerned; by reason of the incorporation of these territo-
ries in the dominions of the British Crown; by virtue of their
115. G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 315-27(4th ed. 1981).
116. Id. at 316.
117. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. ser A/B, No. 53,
at 46.
118. Bernhardt, supra note 65, at 322-26; II M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST Ol INT'L L. 1030-
1232(1963).
119. See Antarctica Cases, supra note 87, at 11-13.
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formal constitution in the Royal Letters Patent of 1908 and
1917 as the British Possession called the Falkland Islands De-
pendencies; the United Kingdom possesses, and at all material
dates has possessed, the sovereignty over the territories of the
Falkland Islands Dependencies, and in particular the South
Sandwich Islands, South Georgia, the South Orkneys, South
Shetlands, Graham Land and Coats Land.""
The central question therefore becomes how effective Great Brit-
ain's occupation has been, and whether or not it has been sufficient
to warrant legal recognition as full and complete sovereign control.
When set against the accepted criteria for effective occupation, the
recorded British experience since 1675 in the region leaves room
for doubt as to whether legal conditions for conferring British sov-
ereignty have been fully met.
That Great Britain possesses legitimate deed to discovering
the aforementioned lands seems historically true and accurate. The
crux of the issue, however, lies couched in the efficacy of British
occupation. International law, through state practice, has estab-
lished such effectiveness to be "the objective manifestation of a
continuous development of control commencing with discovery and
subsequent inchoate title and continuing by permanent settlement
and administration."12' If this is so, the British claim suffers no-
ticeably from the profound absence of any permanent settlement
on all save one of their territories, viz., the Falkland Islands (which
has a local population of some 1800).122 South Georgia and the
South Sandwich Islands are virtually uninhabited, and the South
Shetland Islands, the South Orkneys, and Graham's Land are
populated only by a chain of small meteorological stations.123 The
paucity of "residents" there are neither indigenous peoples nor
British colonists; they are scientists assigned to operated the
facilities.
The point should be made, nonetheless, that the South Polar
area climatically is incredibly inhospitable; in fact, the Antarctic
environs can be aptly described as one of extremes, being the
coldest, driest, windiest, and remotest place on earth. 4 Given
120. Id. at 37.
121. Bernhardt, supra note 65, at 322.
122. THE WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 574 (H. Lane ed. 1983).
123. Id.
124. As described by F.M. Auburn,
Antarctica has the highest average elevation of all the continents (2.5 kin).
Combined with a number of other factors, such as the degree of radiation reflec-
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these extraordinary harsh environmental conditions, suggestion
has been made that perhaps special or exceptional consideration
ought to be made for Antarctica-based claims; i.e., because normal
"effective occupation" as usually applied to perfect title is essen-
tially impossible in Antarctic conditions, less stringent degrees of
effectiveness should be entertained there.2 Here is not the place
to debate the "exceptions" polemic; others have done that more
authoritatively, without universally conclusive results.1 26  What
must be posited, though, is that at minimum, effective control for
securing recognized sovereign title in the Antarctic would necessi-
tate "actual continuous and peaceful display of state functions,'1 27
- if not directly through permanent settlement, then, conceivably,
indirectly through "effective" administrative purview.
Administratively, British claims to legal title were clearly
spelled out in the King's Letters Patent of 1908."'8 This royal proc-
lamation publicly declared formal organization of the Falkland Is-
lands Dependencies, consisting of the Falkland Islands, South
Georgia, the South Orkneys, the South Shetlands, the South Sand-
wich Islands, and Graham's Land.'2 ' As British commentators are
quick to note, the Letters Patent did not posit a claim of British
tion from snow surfaces, this makes it the coldest region on earth. The mean
temperature of the plateau of East Antarctica is -56°C. Temperatures in coastal
areas are less severe, although the most favoured regions of the Antarctic Penin-
sula only have mean summer readings above freezing for four months. Steady
winds of over 100 km. per hour are not uncommon in winter. Most of Antarctica
- the high plateau - is the world's largest and driest desert. At the South Pole,
there is precipitation (usually snow) of less than 5 cm. each year, and Antarc-
tica's only river, the Onyx, flows in summer from the melt waters of the Wright
Glacier in the Ross Dependency over a course of 30 km. There are no land
vertebrates. It is the sole continent without trees, and all its three flowering
plants are recent and marginal invaders.
AuBURN, supra note 63, at 1-2 (footnotes omitted). On July 21, 1983, Soviet polar research-
ers reported a record low temperature of -129*F at a research station in Antarctica. Wash-
ington Post, July 24, 1983, at A23, col. 1.
125. This so-called "minimal control" theory has engendered mixed conclusions by le-
gal commentators. Compare M. LINDLEY, THE AcQUISIrON AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD
TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 158(1926); Hyde, Acquisition of Sovereignty in Polar Ar-
eas, 19 IOWA L. REv. 286-88(1934); Johnson, Consolidation as a Root of Title in Interna-
tional Law, CAMBRIDGE L.J. 215-22(1955); Daniel, supra note 53, at 252; and Taubenfeld,
supra note 43, at 252.
126. E.g., compare the following series of international cases and arbitral decisions: Le-
gal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J.22, ser. A/B, No. 53; Clipperton
Island Arbitral Award (Fr. v. Mex.), January 28, 1931; Minquiers and Ecrehos (U.K. v. Fr.)
1953 I.C.J.47; and Island of Palmas Case, (Perm.Ct.Arb.) 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829 (1929).
127. Island of Palmas Case (Perm.Ct.Arb.) 2 U.N.R.I.A.A.829 (1928).
128. Letters Patent of July 21, 1908, supra note 104, at 76-77.
129. Id.
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sovereignty; such an assertion was presumed already extant and
deemed legitimized, principally because no overt foreign challenge
to it had been forthcoming during the nineteenth century.130 The
statement, it is argued, simply confirmed Great Britain's previous
circumpolar claims and consolidated them under a unitary admin-
istrative structure. 131
In terms of being a suitable vehicle for substantiating British
sovereign control in the Antarctic, the Letters Patent of 1908
evinces some critical deficiencies. First, although predicated upon
title to territory secured by discovery, portions of some lands in-
cluded in the Letters Patent clearly had been discovered or ini-
tially surveyed by nationals from states other than Great Britain.
For example, Admiral Thaddeus Bellingshausen of Russia exten-
sively explored the South Sandwich group during 1819-21.131 In
1838-40, a French expedition under Dumont d'Urville surveyed
and charted the South Orkneys, South Shetlands and Graham's
Land.' Additionally, the Belgian Antarctic Expedition com-
manded by Adrien de Gerlache in 1897_99,134 the Swedish Polar
Expedition of 1901-04, led by Otto Nordenskjild,3  and the
French Antarctic Expedition of 1903-05, under J.B. Charcot s6 all
performed noteworthy explorations in the Graham Land area.
Hence, considerable foreign discovery and exploration occurred in
British-claimed areas, apparently without seeking or securing offi-
cial British advice, consent or permission in the process.
A second difficulty associated with the Letters Patent of 1908
is that such a unilateral declaration, ipso facto, looms inadequate
for demonstrating national sovereignty over a territory. The proc-
lamation was merely a Royal Prerogative, designed to modify ad-
ministrative boundaries of a non-self-governing territory, and to
set up an appropriate supervisory structure.1 37 Hence, the Letters
130. CHRISTIE, supra note 12, at 240.
131. Id.
132. See T. BELLINGSHAUSEN, THE VOYAGE OF CAPTAIN BELLINGSHAUSEN TO THE
ANTARCTIC SEAS, 1819-1821 (F. Debenham ed. 1945).
133. See J. DuMoNT D'URVILLE, VOYAGE AU POLE SUD ET DANS L'OC19ANIC SUR LES COR-
VETTES L'ASTROLABE ET LA ZtL] (1841).
134. See A. DE GERLACHE, QUINZE MOIS DANS L'ANTARCTIQUE (1902).
135. See 0. NORDENSKJOLD & J. ANDERSSON, ANTARCTICA (1905).
136. See J. CHARCOT, AUTOUR DU P6LE Sun, EXPEDITION DU 'FRANCOIS', 1903-1905
(1906).
137. The Letters Patent of 1908 provided for establishing the Governor of the Falkland
Islands conjointly to be Governor of "South Georgia, the South Orkneys, the South
Shetlands, and the Sandwich Islands, and the territory of Graham's Land" (i.e., "the De-
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Patent of 1908, must be viewed purely as a domestic measure, in-
tended to facilitate Great Britain's governance of claimed lands
more than 8000 miles away. Obviously, such an intention presup-
poses the legal right to govern. However, the Letters Patent
neither substantiated the claim nor validated sovereign title. Le-
gally, it merely presumed the claims' validity and was accordingly
proclaimed as a product of those claims' believed existence.
Third, as stated in the 1908 Letters Patent, the enumerated
"Dominion" island groups are described as being "situated in the
South Atlantic Ocean to the south of the 50th Parallel of South
latitude and lying between the 20th and 80th degrees of West lon-
gitude." 1388 Interestingly, if interpreted literally, those geographical
coordinates would encompass several islands offshore Chile and
Argentina, more precisely in the lower Patagonian zone, south of
the 50th Parallel.'39 In order to assuage possible political misun-
derstandings, particularly by Argentina, a second Letters Patent
was issued on March 28, 1917.' 0 This proclamation, while reaffirm-
ing the intent of the 1908 document, clarified Great Britain's claim
to include
all islands and territories whatsoever between the twentieth de-
gree of west longitude and the fiftieth degree of west longitude
which are situated south of the 50th Parallel of south latitude;
and all islands and territories whatsoever between the fiftieth
degree of west longitude and the eightieth degree of west longi-
tude which are situated south of the 58th Parallel of south
latitude.14"
Hence, island groups or rocks located within the territorial wa-
ters of Argentina and Chile thereby were disqualified from any
possible misconceived British appropriation. Even so, like its pred-
ecessor, the 1917 Letters Patent must be regarded in international
law as only providing a domestic declaration of policy. Accordingly,
it did not either validate or substantiate Great Britain's claims to
sovereign title over these territories.
Also relevant to Great Britain's allegation of title is the fact
that its claims to the Ross Dependency and Australian Antarctic
pendencies"). Letters Patent of July 21, 1908, supra note 104, at para. 2. Also provided for
was creation of an "Executive Council for the Dependencies," Id. at para. 4.
138. Id. at preambular para.
139. See Antarctic Reference Map, in CIA POLAR ATLAS, supra note 85, at back cover.
140. Letters Patent of Mar. 28, 1917, supra note 105, at 16-17.
141..Id. at para. 1.
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Territory were asserted by Orders in Council in 192342 and
1933,13 respectively. At that time, the former territory was placed
under the jurisdiction of New Zealand""' and the latter under the
governor of the Commonwealth of Australia.1" 5 Parenthetically, it
is interesting indeed to speculate on the legal complications which
would be generated if Great Britain's claims to its Antarctic terri-
tories were someday adjudged by an international tribunal to have
never been legally extant. In great likelihood, New Zealand's and
Australia's claims to territory in Antarctica coincidentally could
then become liable to challenge, and their legal status would essen-
tially become relegated to that of adopted offspring, spawned from
an illegitimate parentage.
Notwithstanding the above critique, no doubt persists that
during this century the British government has evinced substantial
confidence in the accepted legality of its claims in the Antarctic
region. Clearly, this preeminent self-assurance was manifest in De-
cember 1947, when Great Britain offerred, though to no avail, the
opportunity to Argentina (and concurrently, Chile) of adjudicating
rightful title through the International Court of Justice. 14 6 Simi-
larly, in April 195114' and again in February 1953,""8 Great Britain
renewed its offer to Argentina (and Chile), but these, too, proved
fruitless. Finally, in May 1955, the British government submitted a
unilateral application to the Court."4e Directed specifically at Ar-
142. Order in Council No. 974 of 30 July 1923, New Zealand Statutory Rules and Or-
ders 712-13 (1924), New Zealand Gazette (Wellington) Aug. 6, 1923, at 2211, reprinted in
U.S. Naval War College, 46 INT'L L. Docs. 236-37(1948-49).
143. Order in Council Placing Certain Territory in the Antarctic seas under the Author-
ity of the Commonwealth of Australia - February 7, 1933, Australia, 2 Statutory Rules and
Orders Revised 1034(1948), reprinted in Naval War College, 46 INT'L L. Docs 236(1948-49).
144. See Regulations for the Ross Dependency of 14 Nov. 1923, New Zealand Gazette
(Wellington), Nov. 15, 1923, at 2815. But cf. AUBURN, supra note 63, at 294, who maintains
that "New Zealand has not produced any evidence of the transfer of the Ross Dependency
to its sovereignty since 1923."
145. Australian Antarctic Territory Acceptance Act, June 13, 1933, Act No. 8 of 1933 in
Australia, I Commonwealth Acts 1901-1950, at 227.
146. Antarctica Cases, supra note 87, at 35. See also Note from British Ambassador Sir
R. Leeper to Argentine Foreign Minister Dr. Bramuglia (Dec. 17, 1947), reprinted in 5 Po-
LAR REc. 229-31(1948).
147. Antarctica Cases, supra note 87, at 35; Note from British Ambassador Sir H. Mack
to Argentine Foreign Minister Dr. Paz (April 30, 1951), reprinted in 6 POLAR REC. 413-
14(1952).
148. Antarctica Cases, supra note 87, at 35; Note from British Ambassador Sir H. Mack
to Argentine Acting Foreign Minister Gen. S. Molina (Feb. 16, 1953), reprinted in 7 PoLAR
REC. 219-20(1954).
149. Antarctica Cases, supra note 87.
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gentina (and Chile), the British Antarctica Cases Application, in
relevant part, averred:
(1) ...;
(2) that the legal titles of the United Kingdom to the Falkland
Islands Dependencies, and in particular to the South Sandwich
Islands, South Georgia, the South Orkneys, South Shetlands,
Graham Land and Coats Land, are, and at all material dates
have been, superior to the claims of any other State, and in par-
ticular to those of the Republic of Argentina;
(3) that, in consequence, the pretensions of the Republic of Ar-
gentina to the South Sandwich Islands, South Georgia, the
South Orkneys, South Shetlands, Graham Land and Coats
Land, and her encroachments and pretended acts of sovereignty
in those territories are, under international law, illegal and
invalid.' 0
Not surprisingly, Argentina15' (and Chile) 152 refused to accept the
International Court's jurisdiction in the matter, and Great Brit-
ain's petition subsequently was removed from the Court's
consideration.153
C. Concluding Observations
Great Britain's historical interest in both the South Atlantic
and the Antarctic has been suitably evident, clearly ample and im-
pressively long-standing. British subjects were among the first to
discover lands in the area, as well as among the earliest and most
active to explore and to chart new-found regions there. In terms of
pre-1900 discovery and exploration accomplishments, then, Great
Britain must rank extremely high, if not paramount, among states
attracted for whatever purposes to the area.
Valid title and justifiable sovereign claims, however, under
modern international law are not predicated upon discovery and
exploration alone. Substantial settlement, augmented by a genuine
intention to occupy the region permanently, are requisite for a
state to perfect legal claim and sovereign title to territory. These
essential conditions appear to be missing in Great Britain's juris-
150. Id. at 37.
151. See Argentine Letter to the International Court of Justice (Aug. 1, 1955), re-
printed in 8 POLAR REC. 50-51(1956) and Antarctica Cases, supra note 87, at 82-83.
152. See Chilean Letter to the International Court of Justice (July 15, 1955), reprinted
in 8 POLAR REc. 48-50(1956) and Antarctica Cases, supra note 87, at 94-96.
153. 1956 ICJ Reports, at 12.
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dictional performance throughout much of the South Atlantic and
Antarctic lands. Admittedly, the British government has histori-
cally regarded selected parts of the Antarctic duly and legally as
theirs; that government also has acted administratively since 1908,
in an apparently responsible fashion that portrays a resolute, legit-
imate title to those territories. Nevertheless, these administrative
actions presuppose the reality of a clearly recognized, uncontested
British title to those lands - a fact which simply never has been
acknowledged unequivocably by the international community, even
up to the present day. Thus, in sum, Great Britain's claims in the
Antarctic region suffer legally from three obvious shortcomings: (1)
these lands never have been permanently settled; (2) consequently,
they never have been effectively occupied; and (3) finally, they
never have been legally recognized. When viewed within the con-
text of contemporary international law, South Georgia, the South
Shetlands, the South Sandwich Islands, the South Orkneys, and
Graham's Land therefore might be regarded as terre nulius more
so than as bona fide British territorial possessions.
IV. THE ANTARCTIC TREATY REGIME, 1961-PRESENT
A. The Antarctic Treaty
The regime presently governing activities on and around the
Antarctic continent was created in 1959 by the Antarctic Treaty. 5 '
A diplomatic outgrowth of the 1958 International Geophysical
Year,'55 the Antarctic Treaty entered into force on June 23, 1961,
after ratification by all twelve signatory states. Importantly, seven
of these states (viz., Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, Great
Britain, New Zealand and Norway) had made prior legal claims to
the region;5 " the remaining five (viz., Belgium, Japan, South Af-
rica, the Soviet Union and the United States) had espoused neither
claim nor the intention to declare any." 7 Significant, too, is that
154. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959. 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71
(entered into force June 23, 1961).
155. See generally S. CHAPMAN, IGY: YEAR OF DISCOVERY (1959).
156. For discussion, see AUBURN, supra note 63, at 48-61; Bernhardt, supra note 65;
Note, supra note 48; and Joyner, supra note 82, at 704-11.
157. See AUBURN supra note 63, at 61-83. But cf. Burton, New Stresses on the
Antarctic Treaty: Toward International Legal Institutions Governing Antarctic Resources,
65 VA. L. REV. 421(1979) and Bilder, The Present Legal and Political Situation in Antarc-
tica, in THE NEW NATIONALISM AND THE USE OF COMMON SPACES 167 (J. Charney ed. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Charney].
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the treaty has functioned well since 1961, and is highly regarded as
a milestone in Cold War diplomacy.
The Antarctic Treaty provides for demilitarization,0 8
denuclearization, 15 and peaceful use only of the continent.'6 0
Moreover, freedom of scientific research, information exchange,
and cooperation,'e as well as on site inspection"6 2 and the obliga-
tion to settle disputes peacefully"' were also purposefully
included.
Perhaps most important for this study, however, is article IV,
which relates specifically to territorial claims. This provision di-
rects that no acts or activities occurring while the treaty is in force
shall "constitute a basis for asserting, supporting, or denying a
claim to territorial sovereignty," or "create any rights of territorial
sovereignty" on the continent.'" Furthermore, new claims, or en-
largement of existing claims to sovereignty should not be asserted
while the treaty remains in effect.166 Finally, albeit surely not least,
existing claims And interests are safeguarded by a proviso that
nothing contained in the treaty should be interpreted as a "renun-
ciation" by any party of "previously asserted rights," "claims" or
"basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in the Antarctic."'"
Stated succinctly, article IV, in effect, legally froze the status quo
ante of various sector claims made to Antarctic territory south of
60' South Latitude, '1 without either qualifying or clarifying the
legitimacy of the claims' character under international law. Today,
that precise situation persists for the overlapping set of Argen-
tinian and British claims to the region.
158. Antarctica Treaty, supra note 154, at art. I.
159. Id. at art. V.
160. Id. at art. I.
161. Id. at arts. II and III.
162. Id. at arts. VII and VIII.
163. Id. at art. XI.
164. Id. at art. IV(2).
165. ld.
166. Id. at art. IV(l).
167. Article VI sets the Treaty's applicability to "the area south of 60° South Latitude,
including all ice shelves," albeit without any prejudice to "the rights, or the exercise of the
rights, of any State under international law with regard to the high seas within that area."
Id. at art. VI.
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B. Potential Sources of Anglo-Argentinian Rivalry in
Antarctica
The Antarctic rather aptly can be described as a vast frigid
desert - in essence a windswept, barren, ice-clad wasteland. 6 '
Why, then, should anyone really care about activities in the region,
much less about possible Anglo-Argentinian rivalries there? Un-
doubtedly, this is a view commonly shared by the vast majority of
laymen, and indeed, by a considerable number of government pol-
icy makers as well. Even so, the answer to this query rests in the
potential presence of natural resources, both living and non-living,
and the prospects for their eventual commercial exploitation dur-
ing the remainder of this century.
Regarding non-living resources in the Antarctic, most informa-
tion concerning the availability of substantial mineral deposits is
primarily geological speculation, predicated upon theoretical likeli-
hood. That is, if the geoscientific notion popularly labeled "conti-
nental drift" is accurate - and the earth's land masses accordingly
were at one time conjoined into a "super-continent" (i.e., the so-
called Gondwanaland) 6 9 - then various minerals found in the
southern portions of South America, Africa, India, Australia and
several associated Pacific island chains conceivably could exist in
Antarctica as well. 70 Admittedly, at present only trace findings of
these minerals have been discovered. '7 Nonetheless, several stud-
ies have conjectured that, very possibly, Antarctica may contain
commercially recoverable deposits of coal, copper, gold, uranium,
silver, nickel, manganese, cobalt, tin, beryl, platinum, molybde-
num, and phosphates.'71 In addition, great interest has also been
168. See supra note 124.
169. See Frakes & Crowell, The Position of Antarctica in Gondwanaland, in RESEARCH
IN THE ArrrARcIc 731 (L. Quarn ed. 1971); Craddock, Antarctica and Gondwanaland, in
POLAR RESEARCH 63 (M. McWhinnie ed. 1978); Craddock, Antarctic Geology and
Gondwanaland, in FROZEN Furrut 101,102 (R. Lewis & P. Smith, eds. 1973).
170. Zumberge, Mineral Resources and Geopolitics in Antarctica, 67 Am. ScmrNT
68,71 (1979). Zumberge, Potential Mineral Resource Availability and Possible Environmen-
tal Problems in Antarctica, in Charney, supra note 157, at 127 [hereinafter cited as
Zumberge, in Charney].
171. Zunberge, in Charney, supra note 157, at 125-27. Professor Zumberge rather pes-
simistically concludes that because of prohibitively expensive extraction costs and logistical
difficulties, "[t]here is a good possibility that no mineral resources on (Antarctic] land will
be mined in the foreseeable future, if ever." Id. at 127. But compare M. HOLDGATE & J.
TINKER, OIL AND OTHER MINERALS IN THE ANTARCTIC (1979).
172. See Craddock, Antarctic Geology and Mineral Resources, in FRAMEWORK FOR As-
SESSING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS ON PossInBL ANTARCTIC MINERAL DEvELOPMENT, at A-7 (D.
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focused on the probability that potential hydrocarbon fields are lo-
cated within Antarctica's continental shelf,173 particularly beneath
the Weddell Sea.1 74 As early as 1974, at least one U.S. government
study reportedly suggested that as much as 45 billion barrels of oil
and 115 trillion cubic feet of natural gas might potentially be
found there.'75 Of special salience to this study, the Weddell Sea
lies at the center of the sectorial region claimed by both Argentina
and Great Britain.
1 7 6
Similarly, with respect to living resources, the South Atlantic-
Antarctic ecosystems teem with marine life. Significant stocks of
seals, whales, fin fish, squid and penguins can be found in the cir-
cumpolar waters.17 Nevertheless, the predominant creature for lu-
crative harvest is a small shrimp-like crustacean called krill
Elliot ed. 1977); and International Institute for Environment and Development, The Future
of Antarctica (Earthscan Press Briefing Doc. No. 5, 1978) reprinted in Exploitation of
Antarctic Resources & Hearings before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, Oceans, and the
International Environment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong. 2d Seas.
189-205(1978).
173. McIver, Hydrocarbon Gases in Canned Core Samples from Leg 28 Sites 271, 272,
and 273, Ross Sea, in 28 INITIAL REPORTS OF THE DEEP SEA DRILLING PROJECT 815 (D. Hayes
& L. Frakes eds. 1975); Splettstoesser, Offshore Development for Oil and Gas in Antarctica,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PORT AND OCEAN ENGINEER-
ING UNDER ARCTIC CONDITIONS 811,813(1978); Antarctic Resources in U.S. Antarctic Policy:
U.S. Policy with Respect to Mineral Exploration and Exploitation in the Antarctic: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and International Environment of the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Seass. 74(1975).
174. Deuser, Lake Maraciabo and Weddell Sea: Comparison in Petroleum Geology, 55
AM. A. OF PETROLEUM GEOLOGISTS BULL. 705,708(1971); and AUBURN, supra note 63, at 247.
175. Spivak, Frozen Assets?, Wall St. J., Feb. 21, 1974, at 1. See also Auburn, Offshore
Oil and Gas in Antarctica, 22 GR. Y.B. INT'L L. 139(1977) and HOLDGATE & TINKER, supra
note 171, at 17-19; B. MITCHELL, FROZEN STAKES: THE FUTURE OF ANTARCTIC MINERALS
(1983). NOTWITHSTANDING THE LOGIC OF THESE SPECULATIONS, IT IS IMPERATIVE TO NOTE THAT
AS OF 1984, "NO PETROLEUM RESOURCES ARE KNOWN IN ANTARCTICA AND THE PETROLEUM INDUS-
TRY IS NOT PARTICULARLY INTERESTED AT PRESENT .... BEHRENDT, Are There Petroleum
Resources in Antarctica?, in Petroleum and Mineral Resources of Antaretica, 3, 22 (J. Beh-
rendt ed. 1983) (U.S. Geological Survey Circular 909).
176. See Territorial Claims (Map) in CIA POLAR ATLAS, supra note 85, at 43.
177. See generally U.S. DEP'T ST., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR A POS-
SIBLE REGIME FOR CONSERVATION OF ANTARCTIC MARINE LIVING RESOURCES (1978); I. EVER-
SON, THE LIVING RESOURCES OF THE SOUTHERN OCEAN (U.N. Doc. UNDP/FAOGLO/SO/77/1
(1977); ANTARCTIC ECOLOGY (M. Holdgate ed. 1970); Antarctic Living Resources Negotia-
tions: Hearings before the National Ocean Policy Study Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. (1978); Llano, Ecology of
the Southern Ocean Region, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 357(1978); Scully, The Marine Living
Resources of the Southern Ocean, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 341(1978); B. MITCHELL & J.
TINKER, ANTARCTICA AND ITS RESOURCES (1980); B. MITCHELL & R. SANDEROOK, THE MAN-
AGEMENT OF THE SOUTHERN OCEAN (1980).
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(Euphasia superba).17 8 With authoritative projections for annual
harvests approaching 100 million metric tons,' 8 krill supplies
would contribute a great deal towards satiating the world's bur-
geoning demand for more protein. 80 The realization that the most
extensive krill concentrations swarm around certain circumpolar
island formations, namely, Bouvet Island, the South Shetlands, the
South Orkneys, South Georgia, and the South Sandwich congrega-
tion is of critical relevance here. 8 1 Save for Bouvet (which is
claimed extensively by Norway), the other island groups are
claimed jointly, and as aforementioned, contentiously, by both Ar-
gentina and Great Britain. 182 In sum, Antarctica's resource base,
though at present precisely indeterminate, is, arguably, believed to
be potentially superabundant. Relatedly, due to harsh environmen-
tal conditions, attendant difficulties of technological access and ex-
traction, and high operational costs, these resources remain liter-
ally entrapped and undeveloped. 8 ' Finally, it is worth noting that
a significant amount of Antarctica's natural resources are situated
seaward from the South Pole at 250 through 750 West Longitude,
north to 600 South Latitude - virtually coincident to the disputed
territories historically and legally claimed by both Argentina and
Great Britain.1 8 4 The point here looms curt and blunt: Should ex-
ploitation of Antarctica's living and/or non-living natural resources
eventually become commercially profitable, the stakes of Anglo-
Argentinian rivalry in the region could rise accordingly. Interest-
ingly enough, in 1982, serious intimations were reported that sus-
pected petroleum deposits offshore the Falkland Islands might
178. See generally G. GRANTHAM, THE UTILZATION OF KRILL (1977); K. GREEN, ROLE OP
KRILL IN THE ANTARCTIC MARINE ECOSYSTEM (1977); TETRA TECH., THE ANTARCTIC KRILL
RESOURCE: PROSPECTS FOR COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION (1978).
179. TETRA TECH. supra note 178, at 121; Mitchell, The Politics of Antarctica, 22 ENVI-
RONMENT 12,13(1980).
180. See AUBURN, supra note 63, at 205-08.
181. See Major Concentration of Krill (Map), in CIA POLAR ATLAS, supra note 85, at
54; and AUBURN supra note 63, at 216-24 ("Krill: Sovereignty").
182. See supra the discussion at notes 146-53. Significantly, however, the threat of im-
pending large scale exploitation during the 1970s motivated the Antarctic Treaty Consulta-
tive Parties (see infra notes 190-98) to conclude a Convention on the Conservation of
Antarctic Marine Living Resources, done May 20, 1980 at Canberra. Reprinted in 19 LL.M.
841-59 (1980), entered into force April 7, 1982 [hereinafter cited as Marine Living Resources
Convention].
183. Pontecorvo, The Economics of the Resources of Antarctica, in Charney, supra
note 157, at 155-65; Zumberge, in Charney, supra note 170, at 145-47.
184. See Known Mineral Occurrences (Map), in CIA POLAR ATLAS, supra note 85, at
57. See also Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea: An Introductory Overview, 13
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 277 (1983).
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have played a significant role in precipitating the Falklands Islands
crisis.185
Granting this resource base, if past national behavior is any
prologue to future international relations, the unraveling of Anglo-
Argentinian rivalry over Antarctic natural resources would not
come as any great surprise. Indeed, given their rather protracted,
highly sensitive territorial dispute over South Atlantic and
Antarctic territories, patently exacerbated by the recent Falkland
Islands military conflict,'8 some casual commentators might re-
gard such a British-Argentine confrontation as logically being inev-
itable in the near future.8 7 Nonetheless, for the foreseeable term,
such a resource competition-war scenario involving Great Britain
and Argentina seems quite unlikely to occur. Obviously, deterring
such a conflict situation is the continued, surfeit availability of rel-
atively inexpensive mineral commodities, hydrocarbons, and
fishery protein from traditional, non-Antarctic sources.' 8 Addi-
tionally, the stark inaccessibility of Antarctic resources, compli-
cated by the harsh physical environment, in combination make
present commercial exploitation of the region economically unat-
tractive, and will likely continue to do so throughout the rest of
this century.18 9 Yet, perhaps paramount in dissuading Anglo-
Argentinian resource competition in the circumpolar region is the
political character of the contemporary Antarctic Treaty regime
and the respective roles each government has assumed in main-
taining it. The study now turns to examine this consideration.
C. The Consultative Party Mechanism
The consultative party system is integral to sustaining Anglo-
Argentinian peaceful co-existence in the Southern Ocean, as well
185. Anderson, Argentina Eyes Antarctica Too, Washington Post, Apr. 12, 1982, at 15.
See also ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, ECONOMIC SURVEY OP THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (1976);
and The Shackleton Incident Could Profit International Law, 259 NATURE 435 (1976).
186. See supra the sources in note 1.
187. See Anderson, supra note 185; Malvinas recovery seen as a way to Reaffirm South
Pole Region, La Prensa (Buenos Aires), Apr. 6, 1982; The Economist, June 12, 1982, at 13.
Compare Beck, Britain's Antarctic Dimension, 59 INT'L AFF. 429 (1983) and Van Sant Hall,
Argentine Policy Motivations in the Falklands War and the Aftermath, 34 NAVAL WAR L.
REV. 21 (1983).
188. See Pontecorvo, supra note 183.
189. Zumberge in Charney, supra note 170, at 127. See also Joyner, Oceanic Pollution
and the Southern Ocean: Rethinking the International Legal Implications for Antarctica,
24 NAT. RESOURCES J. (1984); Boczek, The Protection of the Antarctica Ecosystem: A Study
in International Environmental Law, 13 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 347 (1983).
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as the Antarctic Treaty regime's operation in general. As provided
for in article IX of the Treaty,190 the Consultative Party group is
comprised of the twelve original parties to the Treaty, 91 plus four
new entrants, Poland in 1977,192 the Federal Republic of Germany
in 1981103 and both Brazil and India in September 1983." 4 The
Consultative Parties meet biennially to hammer out regional poli-
cies, which are arrived at through consensus in the form of "recom-
mendations". 195 To the extent one is evinced, the Antarctic Con-
sultative Party Group serves as the governing body for the Treaty
regime.'90 Of note is the fact that Argentina and Great Britain are
both principal actors in this consultative process.
Both Argentina and Great Britain have enjoyed Consultative
Party status since the Treaty's entry into force in 1961, and to-
gether they have participated regularly and actively-even during
190. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 154, at art. IX.
191. Id. at art IX(1) (Referring to "the Contracting Parties named in the preamble to
the present Treaty," viz., "The Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, the
French Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and
the United States of America .. ").
192. Final Report of the First Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, Doc.
ANT/SCM/6 (London, July 29, 1977), reprinted in 1 ANTARCTICA & INT'L L., supra note 17,
at 331-33.
193. Final Report of the Third Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (Buenos
Aires, March 3, 1981), Doc. ANT(81) IIIRCE/2, reprinted in 1 ANTARCTICA & INT'L L., supra
note 17, at 432-33.
194. International Institute for Environment and Development, Up-Date on Antarctic
Development-1983 (Oct. 17, 1983)(mimeo).
195. As provided for in article IX of the Treaty. Specifically, article IX designates con-
sultations and recommendations by the Consultative Parties on measures regarding:
(a) use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only;
(b) facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica;
(c) facilitation of international scientific co-operation in Antarctica;
(d) facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection provided for in Article
VII of the Treaty;
(e) questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica;
(f) preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica.
Antarctic Treaty, supra note 154, at art. IX(1)(a-f). A compilation of the Consultative Par-
ties' first 118 recommendations through 1978 is found in U.S. DEP'T ST., HANDBOOK OF MEA-
SURRS IN FURTHERANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY (2d ed.
1979). The subsequent 12 recommendations are found in Report and Recommendations of
the Tenth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (Washington, D.C. Sept. 17-Oct. 5, 1979),
Doc. ANT/X/49 (Rev. 1 of 5 Oct. 1979), reprinted in 20 POLAR REc. 88-99(1980); Report
and Recommendations of the Eleventh Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (Buenos
Aires, June 23-July 7, 1981), Doc. ANT/XI/34/Add. 1, reprinted in 20 POLAR REC. 590-
93(1981). For discussion, see AuBuRN, supra note 63, at 165-70.
196. See Guyer, The Antarctic System, 139 REC. DES COURS 149(1973); and AURURN,
supra note 63, at 147-83.
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the 1982 Falklands conflict197 - to fashion policy recommenda-
tions under the Treaty's auspices."' Importantly, moreover, pre-
sent indications suggest that they will continue to convene jointly
and cooperate together in Consultative Party negotiations,"' in
spite of the vehement territorial dispute in the area that has
clouded Anglo-Argentinian relations for over a century.
Given the climate of discord, especially in the aftermath of the
Falklands War, one is prompted to speculate why either Argentina
or Great Britain should continue to sit down with each other at the
same negotiating table and participate in discussions aimed at ef-
fecting oversight policies for territories which they both claim as
legally being their own. The answer to this seemingly paradoxical
conundrum is found, simply, in political pragmatism: the current
Consultative Party system serves both Argentina's and Great Brit-
ain's national interests in the region better than no formal regime
at all. Perhaps even more telling, the present system appears to
them far more preferable than other conceivable alternative re-
gimes.200 Very likely, included among these less desirable options
would be internationalization of the Antarctic into a portion of
"the Common Heritage of Mankind;" 01 transition of the region
into a trusteeship territory under the United Nations' aegis;202 or,
even permitting the continent to be declared terra nullius, and
thereby opened to national claim and unrestricted exploitation by
any or all states.2 08
197. Report of the First Session of the Special Consultative Meeting on Antarctic Min-
eral Resources (Wellington, June 14-15, 1982), Doc. AMR/SCM/21/Rev. 1/Corr. 1, at
1(1982); Shapley, Antarctica: Up for Grabs, 211 Sci. 75 (Nov. 1982).
198. See supra note 195. Among recent accomplishments of the Antarctic Treaty Con-
sultative Parties was the promulgation of a special multilateral accord, The Convention on
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, in 1980, which entered into force in
April 1982. For discussion, see Frank, The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic
Marine Living Resources, 13 OCEAN DEv. & INrr'L L. 291 (1983).
199. See L. Kimball, Report on Antarctic Events; 1983, prepared for the International
Institute for Environment and Development (June, 1983).
200. See Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea: Rethinking the Current Legal
Dilemmas, 18 SAN DEEGo L. REv. 415,435(1981).
201. Id. at 439; Joyner, supra note 82, at 722. Also see Larschan & Brennan, The Com-
mon Heritage of Mankind Principle in International Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
305,331-34(1983).
202. Joyner, supra note 200, at 438. Cf. Barnes, The Emerging Convention on the Con-
servation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources: An Attempt to Meet the New Realities of
Resource Exploitation in the Southern Ocean, in Charney, supra note 157, at 239,269.
203. The prospects for such a terra nullius scenario occurring seem virtually nil, given
that (a) at least seven states now formally claim title to territory in the Antarctic area and
(b) natural resources may exist there in commercially exploitable quantities. But compare
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Thus, Argentina and Great Britain, for the time being, appear
politically willing and governmentally content with the status quo
situation operative under the Treaty regime. They each reap full
diplomatic benefits of Consultative Party status (i.e., priority as-
sessment, policy input and direction, representative voice and con-
census vote)2" without incurring ostensible risks or costs associ-
ated with open bilateral disputes. Further, they are each members
of a relatively small decision-making body (of sixteen) who have
self-assumed legal responsibility for political and environmental
husbandry over the Antarctic.205 This status, in itself, conveys a
certain international clout, particularly in realizing that the vast
majority of the world community remains estranged from ever
gaining - or even seeking to attain - Consultative Party mem-
bership.2" The ultimate consequence is that for the remainder of
the 1980s, both Argentina and Great Britain are likely to perceive
greater political liabilities to their respective Antarctic-related
claims absent the present Treaty regime. Past exploration invest-
ments, declarations of title, and strategic considerations notwith-
Rose, Antarctic Condominium: Building a New Legal Order for Commercial Interests,
MAINE TzCH. Soc'Y J. 19 (1976) and Joyner, supra note 82, at 721.
204. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 154, at art. IX.
205. This self-assertion appears evident by the Consultative Parties' concerted unilat-
eral negotiation of the Marine Living Resources Convention, supra note 182, as well as their
more recent attention to a future regional minerals regime. See Colson, The Antarctic
Treaty System: The Mineral Issue, 12 L. & POLICY IN INrT'L Bus. 841(1980); Charney, Fu-
ture Strategies for an Antarctic Mineral Resource Regime - Can the Environment Be
Protected?, in Charney, supra note 157, at 206; and AUBURN, supra note 63, at 241-67.
206. See Auburn, Consultative Status under the Antarctic Treaty, 28 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 514 (1979). Professor Auburn has observed elsewhere that
Ithere is no indication that the Consultative Parties may be willing to relin-
quish their monopoly of Antarctic decision-making; if anything, the trend is in
the opposite direction. Resource regimes have been negotiated in detail, and al-
though the two Conferences held so far, for seals and living resources, have been
outside the Treaty framework the draft articles previously prepared by the Con-
sultative Parties have been insisted upon in all vital respects. Maintenance of
control by the Antarctic Treaty countries is ensured by the narrow limits on
invitations to third parties and the assertion of a veto over the admission of such
nations to the equivalent of Consultative status under the new regime.
AUBURN, supra note 63, at 292. More recently, however, Lee Kimball has posited she detects
the unfolding of a "'gradualist' approach" by the Consultative Parties to expand outside
observer participation in and documents availability from Consultative Meetings. Kimball,
supra note 199, at 11. Relatedly, the United Nations has recently acquired an interest in
Antarctica's legal status and the future exploitation of its resources, ostensibly with a view
towards considering the region a portion of "the common heritage of mankind." See Berlin,
U.N. Launches Debate on Antarctia, Washington Post, Dec. 1, 1983, at A33, Col. 1. It seems
safe to assume that neither Argentina nor Great Britain would favor such a radical change
from the current Antarctic Treaty regime.
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standing, the Consultative Party process today is deemed more
palatable by Argentina and Great Britain than other imaginable
schemes; and, barring some dramatically unsettling political devel-
opment, this pragmatic attitude seems unlikely to change before
the Treaty becomes eligible for review in 1991. 07 In short, the
Consultative Party process remains the strongest administrative
cement sustaining pacific Anglo-Argentinian coexistence in the
Antarctic. In so doing, it concomitantly has worked to ameliorate
nationalistic tensions and antipathies over disputed territories, al-
beit at the cost of leaving those claims' status in legal limbo.
V. CONCLUSION
The Falkland Islands War in 1982, clearly highlighted the
"volatility" and tensions between Argentina and Great Britain
over the South Atlantic territories. Coincident with this fact, how-
ever, the realization that Anglo-Argentinian rivalry in the region
supercedes the realm of the Falklands/Malvinas archipelago also
surfaced. In actuality, this conflict revealed that the dispute
reaches farther into the Southern Ocean to encompass the islands
of South Georgia, the South Orkneys, the South Shetlands, the
South Sandwich group, as well as a substantial segment of Antarc-
tica. Salient, too, in this connection, is that Anglo-Argentinian ri-
valry is neither of recent vintage nor of fleeting duration. Histori-
cally, it has been protracted, steadfast, and intransigent, as well as
ultranationalistic, vituperative, and at times, militarily confronta-
tional. Stated forthrightly, the seeds for future conflict between
Argentina and Great Britain may have been sown in Antarctica's
frozen turf.
Respective to international law, both Argentina and Great
Britain have each purposively designed legal arguments substanti-
ating their claims to sovereign title over selected territories in the
region. Even so, this study must conclude that neither argument is
sufficiently compelling or definitively convincing to warrant the
award of clear and unequivocal title to either party. Indeed, given
the politico-legal arrangement for the Antarctic operating during
the past two decades, both Argentina and Great Britain appear
willing to accept the status quo situation and forego pressing the
legitimacy of their own claims. To do contrariwise, it should be
noted, could likely unravel the Antarctic Treaty regime and
207. Accord, Antarctic Treaty, supra note 154, at art. XII 2(a).
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thereby denigrate the quasi-privileged Consultative Party status
each state now enjoys.
In the final analysis, the Falkland Islands War of 1982 mani-
festly revealed that, at least for Argentina and Great Britain, lands
in the South Atlantic are worth expending a considerable measure
of military, economic, diplomatic, and human capital. For the fore-
seeable future, it seems safe to posit that equivalent stakes proba-
bly will not be attached either by Argentina or Great Britain to
Antarctica and its indigenous resources. Nevertheless, one abiding
observation also seems certain: as worldwide industrialization pro-
ceeds and burgeoning population growth persists, finite natural re-
sources will dwindle; consequently, commercial interest in exploit-
ing Antarctica's resource potential will, most likely appreciate
accordingly, not only by Argentina and Great Britain, but also by
the international community as a whole. Cognizant of the sensitive
historical antipathy and the professed vested interests in the
Antarctic area, one cannot help but wonder in what ways Argen-
tina and Great Britain will respond to that eventual situation.
Whatever emanates as their reaction, it should undeniably greatly
affect any future opportunities for exploitation in the Southern
Ocean. More importantly, it will signal realistic prospects for geo-
political conflict or peaceful legal accommodation over the cold
continent. Hopefully, the diplomatic road traveled by Anglo-
Argentinian dealings will prove to follow the latter course.
[Vol. 15:3
